Reasonableness, Balance, and Constitutional Rights

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31381/iusinkarri.v1n1.5607

Abstract

There is an intrinsic relationship between good sense, balance, and constitutional rights. My deliberations begin with an analysis of the concept of reasonableness. This leads to the thesis that equilibrium is the essence of what is reasonable. Balance, in turn, presupposes the discourse. Through discourse a considerable degree of objectivity can be achieved. This does not mean, however, that subjectivity can be completely avoided. This leads to the need for the law. Reasonableness requires that human rights must be incorporated into positive law, as constitutional rights. In this way, the balance finds its place in the constitutional review.

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Published

2011-10-11

How to Cite

Alexy, R. (2011). Reasonableness, Balance, and Constitutional Rights. Ius Inkarri, 1(1), 17–27. https://doi.org/10.31381/iusinkarri.v1n1.5607

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Research Articles